哲学史-philosophy of history(英文版)-第8章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


conclusion　immediately　follows　that　he；　the　pedagogue；　is　a　better　man　than　they；　because　he　has
not　such　passions；　a　proof　of　which　lies　in　the　fact　that　he　does　not　conquer　Asia；　—　vanquish
Darius　and　Porus；　—　but　while　he　enjoys　life　himself　lets　others　enjoy　it　too。　These　psychologists
are　particularly　fond　of　contemplating　those　peculiarities　of　great　historical　figures　which　appertain
to　them　as　private　persons。　Man　must　eat　and　drink；　he　sustains　relations　to　friends　and
acquaintances；　he　has　passing　impulses　and　ebullitions　of　temper。　“No　man　is　a　hero　to　his
valet…de…chambre；”　is　a　well…known　proverb；　I　have　added　—　and　Goethe　repeated　it　ten　years
later　—　“but　not　because　the　former　is　no　hero；　but　because　the　latter　is　a　valet。”　He　takes　off　the
hero's　boots；　assists　him　to　bed；　knows　that　he　prefers　champagne；　&c。　Historical　personages
waited　upon　in　historical　literature　by　such　psychological　valets；　e　poorly　off；　they　are　brought
down　by　these　their　attendants　to　a　level　with　—　or　rather　a　few　degrees　below　the　level　of　—　the
morality　of　such　exquisite　discerners　of　spirits。　The　Thersites　of　Homer　who　abuses　the　kings　is　a
standing　figure　for　all　times。　Blows　—　that　is　beating　with　a　solid　cudgel　—　he　does　not　get　in　every
age　as　in　the　Homeric　one；　but　his　envy；　his　egotism；　is　the　thorn　which　he　has　to　carry　in　his　flesh；
and　the　undying　worm　that　gnaws　him　is　the　tormenting　consideration　that　his　excellent　views　and
vituperations　remain　absolutely　without　result　in　the　world。　But　our　satisfaction　at　the　fate　of
Thersitism　also；　may　have　its　sinister　side。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　35

A　World…historical　individual　is　not　so　unwise　as　to　indulge　a　variety　of　wishes　to　divide　his
regards。　He　is　devoted　to　the　One　Aim；　regardless　of　all　else。　It　is　even　possible　that　such　men
may　treat　other　great；　even　sacred　interests；　inconsiderately；　conduct　which　is　indeed　obnoxious　to
moral　reprehension。　But　so　mighty　a　form　must　trample　down　many　an　innocent　flower…crush　to
pieces　many　an　object　in　its　path。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　36

The　special　interest　of　passion　is　thus　inseparable　from　the　active　development　of　a　general
principle：　for　it　is　from　the　special　and　determinate　and　from　its　negation；　that　the　Universal　results。
Particularity　contends　with　its　like；　and　some　loss　is　involved　in　the　issue。　It　is　not　the　general　idea
that　is　implicated　in　opposition　and　bat；　and　that　is　exposed　to　danger。　It　remains　in　the
background；　untouched　and　uninjured。　This　may　be　called　the　cunning　of　reason；　—　that　it　sets
the　passions　to　work　for　itself；　while　that　which　develops　its　existence　through　such　impulsion　pays
the　penalty　and　suffers　loss。　For　it　is　phenomenal　being　that　is　so　treated；　and　of　this；　part　is　of　no
value；　part　is　positive　and　real。　The　particular　is　for　the　most　part　of　too　trifling　value　as　pared
with　the　general：　individuals　are　sacrificed　and　abandoned。　The　Idea　pays　the　penalty　of
determinate　existence　and　of　corruptibility；　not　from　itself；　but　from　the　passions　of　individuals。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　37

But　though　we　might　tolerate　the　idea　that　individuals；　their　desires　and　the　gratification　of　them；
are　thus　sacrificed；　and　their　happiness　given　up　to　the　empire　of　chance；　to　which　it　belongs；　and
that　as　a　general　rule；　individuals　e　under　the　category　of　means　to　an　ulterior　end；　—　there　is
one　aspect　of　human　individuality　which　we　should　hesitate　to　regard　in　that　subordinate　light；　even
in　relation　to　the　highest；　since　it　is　absolutely　no　subordinate　element；　but　exists　in　those　individuals
as　inherently　eternal　and　divine。　I　mean　morality；　ethics；　religion。　Even　when　speaking　of　the
realisation　of　the　great　ideal　aim　by　means　of　individuals；　the　subjective　element　in　them　—　their
interest　and　that　of　their　cravings　and　impulses；　their　views　and　judgments；　though　exhibited　as　the
merely　formal　side　of　their　existence；　—　was　spoken　of　as　having　an　infinite　right　to　be　consulted。
The　first　idea　that　presents　itself　in　speaking　of　means　is　that　of　something　external　to　the　object；
and　having　no　share　in　the　object　itself。　But　merely　natural　things　—　even　the　monest　lifeless
objects　—　used　as　means；　must　be　of　such　a　kind　as　adapts　them　to　their　purpose；　they　must
possess　something　in　mon　with　it。　Human　beings　least　of　all；　sustain　the　bare　external　relation
of　mere　means　to　the　great　ideal　aim。　Not　only　do　they　in　the　very　act　of　realising　it；　make　it　the
occasion　of　satisfying　personal　desires；　whose　purport　is　diverse　from　that　aim　—　but　they　share　in
that　ideal　aim　itself；　and　are　for　that　very　reason　objects　of　their　own　existence；　not　formally
merely；　as　the　world　of　living　beings　generally　is　—　whose　individual　life　is　essentially　subordinate
to　that　of　man；　and　is　properly　used　up　as　an　instrument。　Men；　on　the　contrary；　are　objects　of
existence　to　themselves；　as　regards　the　intrinsic　import　of　the　aim　in　question。　To　this　order
belongs　that　in　them　which　we　would　exclude　from　the　category　of　mere　means；　…　Morality；　Ethics；
Religion。　That　is　to　say；　man　is　an　object　of　existence　in　himself　only　in　virtue　of　the　Divine　that　is　in
him；　—　that　which　was　designated　at　the　outset　as　Reason；　which；　in　view　of　its　activity　and　power
of　self…determination；　was　called　Freedom。　And　we　affirm　—　without　entering　at　present　on　the
proof　of　the　assertion　…that　Religion；　Morality；　&c。　have　their　foundation　and　source　in　that
principle；　and　so　are　essentially　elevated　above　all　alien　necessity　and　chance。　And　here　we　must
remark　that　individuals；　to　the　extent　of　their　freedom；　are　responsible　for　the　depravation　and
enfeeblement　of　morals　and　religion。　This　is　the　seal　of　the　absolute　and　sublime　destiny　of　man　—
that　be　knows　what　is　good　and　what　is　evil；　that　his　destiny　is　his　very　ability　to　will　either　good　or
evil；　—　in　one　word；　that　he　is　the　subject　of　moral　imputation；　imputation　not　only　of　evil；　but　of
good；　and　not　only　concerning　this　or　that　particular　matters　and　all　that　happens　ab　extra；　but
also　the　good　and　evil　attaching　to　his　individual　freedom。　The　brute　alone　is　simply　innocent。　It
would；　however　demand　an　extensive　explanation　—　as　extensive　as　the　analysis　of　moral　freedom
itself　—　to　preclude　or　obviate　all　the　misunderstandings　which　the　statement　that　what　is　called
innocent　imports　the　entire　unconsciousness　of　evil　—　is　wont　to　occasion。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　38

In　contemplating　the　fate　which　virtue；　morality；　even　piety　experience　in　history；　we　must　not　fall
into　the　Litany　of　Lamentations；　that　the　good　and　pious　often　—　or　for　the　most　part　—　fare　ill　in
the　world；　while　the　evil…disposed　and　wicked　prosper。　The　term　prosperity　is　used　in　a　variety　of
meanings　—　riches；　outward　honour；　and　the　like。　But　in　speaking　of　something　which　in　and　for
itself　constitutes　an　aim　of　existence；　that　so…called　well　or　ill…faring　of　these　or　those　isolated
individuals　cannot　be　regarded　as　an　essential　element　in　the　rational　order　of　the　universe。　With
more　justice　than　happiness　—　or　a　fortunate　environment　for　individuals；　—　it　is　demanded　of　the
grand　aim　of　the　world's　existence；　that　it　should　foster；　nay　involve　the　execution　and　ratification
of　good；　moral；　righteous　purposes。　What　makes　men　morally　discontented　（a　discontent；　by　the
bye；　on　which　they　somewhat　pride　themselves）；　is　that　they　do　not　find　the　present　adapted　to　the
realisation　of　aims　which　they　hold　to　be　right　and　just　（more　especially　in　modern　times；　ideals　of
political　constitutions）；　they　contrast　unfavourably　things　as　they　are；　with　their　idea　of　things　as
they　ought　to　be。　In　this　case　it　is　not　private　interest　nor　passion　that　desires　gratification；　but
Reason；　Justice；　Liberty；　and　equipped　with　this　title；　the　demand　in　question　assumes　a　lofty
bearing；　and　readily　adopts　a　position　not　merely　of　discontent；　but　of　open　revolt　against　the
actual　condition　of　the　world。　To　estimate　such　a　feeling　and　such　views　aright；　the　demands
insisted　upon；　and　the　very　dogmatic　opinions　asserted；　must　be　examined。　At　no　time　so　much　as
in　our　own；　have　such　general　principles　and　notions　been　advanced；　or　with　greater　assurance。　If
in　days　gone　by；　history　seems　to　present　itself　as　a　struggle　of　passions；　in　our　time　—　though
displays　of　passion　are　not　wanting　—　it　exhibits　partly　a　predominance　of　the　struggle　of　notions
assuming　the　authority　of　principles；　partly　that　of　passions　and　interests　essentially　subjective；　but
under　the　mask　of　such　higher　sanctions。　The　pretensions　thus　contended　for　as　legitimate　in　the
name　of　that　which　has　been　stated　as　the　ultimate　aim　of　Reason；　pass　accordingly；　for　absolute
aims；　—　to　the　same　extent　as　Religion；　Morals；　Ethics。　Nothing；　as　before　remarked；　is　now　more
mon　than　the　plaint　that　the　ideals　which　imagination　sets　up　are　not　realised　—　that　these
glorious　dreams　are　destroyed　by　cold　actuality。　These　Ideals　—　which　in　the　voyage　of　life
founder　on　the　rocks　of　hard　reality　—　may　be　in　the　first　instance　only　subjective；　and　belong　to
the　idiosyncrasy　of　the　individual；　imagining　himself　the　highest　and　wisest。　Such　do　not　properly
belong　to　this　category。　For　the　fancies　which　the　individual　in　his　isolation　indulges；　cannot　be　the
model　for　universal　reality；　just　as　universal　law　is　not　designed　for　the　units　of　the　mass。　These　as
such　may；　in　fact；　find　their　interests　decidedly　thrust　into　the　background。　But　by　the　term
“Ideal；”　we　also　understand　the　ideal　of　Reason；　of　the　Good；　of　the　True。　Poets；　as　e。g。
Schiller；　have　painted　such　ideals　touchingly　and　with　strong　emotion；　and　with　the　deeply
melancholy　conviction　that　they　could　not　be　realised。　In　affirming；　on　the　contrary　that　the
Universal　Reason　does　realise　itself；　we　leave　indeed　nothing　to　do　with　the　individual　empirically
regarded。　That　admits　of　degrees　of　better　and　worse；　since　here　chance　and　speciality　have
received　authority　from　the　Idea　to　exercise　their　monstrous　power。　Much；　therefore；　in　particular
aspects　of　the　grand　phenomenon　might　be　found　fault　with。　This　subjective　fault…finding；　—　which；
however；　only　keeps　in　view　the　individual　and　its　deficiency；　without　taking　notice　of　Reason
pervading　the　whole；　—　is　easy；　and　inasmuch　as　it　asserts　an　excellent　intention　with　regard　to　the
good　of　the　whole；　and　seems　to　result　from　a　kindly　heart；　it　feels　authorised　to　give　itself　airs　and
assume　great　consequence。　It　is　easier　to　discover　a　deficiency　in　individuals；　in　states；　and　in
Providence；　than　to　see　their　real　import　and　value。　For　in　this　merely　negative　fault…finding　a
proud　position　is　taken；　—　one　which　overlooks　the　object；　without　having　entered　into　it；　—
without　having　prehended　its　positive　aspect。　Age　generally　makes　men　more　tolerant；　youth　is
always　discontented。　The　tolerance　of　age　is　the　result　of　the　ripeness　of　a　judgment　which；　…　not
merely　as　the　result　of　indifference；　is　satisfied　even　with　what　is　inferior；　but；　more　deeply　taught
by　the　grave　experience　of　life；　has　been　led　to　perceive　the　substantial；　solid　worth　of　the　object
in　question。　The　insight　then　to　which　—　in　contradistinction　from　those　ideals　—　philosophy　is　to
lead　us；　is；　that　the　real　world　is　as　it　ought　to　be　—　that　the　truly　good　—　the　universal　divine
reason　—　is　not　a　mere　abstraction；　but　a　vital　principle　capable　of　realising　itself。　This　Good；　this
Reason；　in　its　most　concrete　form；　is　God。　God　governs　the　world；　the　actual　working　of　his
government　—　the　carrying　out　of　his　plan　—　is　the　History　of　the　World。　This　plan　philosophy
strives　to　prehend；　for　only　that　which　has　been　developed　as　the　result　of　it；　possesses　bona
fide　reality。　That　which　does　not　accord　with　it；　is　negative；　worthless　existence。　Before　the　pure
light　of　this　divine　Idea　—　which　is　no　mere　Idea　…　the　phantom　of　a　world　whose　events　are　an
incoherent　concourse　of　fortuitous　circumstances；　utterly　vanishes。　Philosophy　wishes　to　discover
the　substantial　purport；　the　real　side　of　the　divine　idea　and　to　justify　the　so　much　despised　Reality
of　things；　for　Reason　is　the　prehension　of　the　Divine　work。　But　as　to　what　concerns　the
perversion；　corruption；　and　ruin　of　religious；　ethical　and　moral　purposes；　and　states　of　society
generally；　it　must　be　affirmed；　that　in　their　essence　these　are　infinite　and　eternal；　but　that　the　forms
they　assume　may　be　of　a　limited　orders　and　consequently　belong　to　the　domain　of　mere　nature；
and　be　subject　to　the　sway　of　chance。　They　are　therefore　perishable；　and　exposed　to　decay　and
corruption。　Religion　and　morality　—　in　the　same　way　as　inherently　universal　essences　—　have　the
peculiarity　of　being　present　in　the　individual　soul；　in　the　full　extent　of　their　Idea；　and　therefore　truly
and　really；　although　they　may　not　manifest　themselves　in　it　in　extenso；　and　are　not　applied　to　fully
developed　relations。　The　religion；　the　morality　of　a　limited　sphere　of　life　—　that　of　a　shepherd　or　a
peasant；　e。g。　—　in　its　intensive　concentration　and　limitation　to　a　few　perfectly　simple　relations　of
life；　—　has　infinite　worth；　the　same　worth　as　th