哲学史-philosophy of history(英文版)-第9章

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peasant；　e。g。　—　in　its　intensive　concentration　and　limitation　to　a　few　perfectly　simple　relations　of
life；　—　has　infinite　worth；　the　same　worth　as　the　religion　and　morality　of　extensive　knowledge；　and
of　an　existence　rich　in　the　pass　of　its　relations　and　actions。　This　inner　focus　—　this　simple
region　of　the　claims　of　subjective　freedom；　—　the　home　of　volition；　resolution；　and　action；　—　the
abstract　sphere　of　conscience；　—　that　which　prises　the　responsibility　and　moral　value　of　the
individual；　remains　untouched；　and　is　quite　shut　out　from　the　noisy　din　of　the　World's　History　—
including　not　merely　external　and　temporal　changes；　but　also　those　entailed　by　the　absolute
necessity　inseparable　from　the　realisation　of　the　Idea　of　Freedom　itself。　But　as　a　general　truth　this
must　be　regarded　as　settled；　that　whatever　in　the　world　possesses　claims　as　noble　and　glorious；
has　nevertheless　a　higher　existence　above　it。　The　claim　of　the　World…Spirit　rises　above　all　special
claims。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　39

These　observations　may　suffice　in　reference　to　the　means　which　the　World…Spirit　uses　for　realising
its　Idea。　Stated　simply　and　abstractly；　this　mediation　involves　the　activity　of　personal　existences　in
whom　Reason　is　present　as　their　absolute　substantial　being；　but　a　basis；　in　the　first　instance；　still
obscure　and　unknown　to　them。　But　the　subject　bees　more　plicated　and　difficult　when　we
regard　individuals　not　merely　in　their　aspect　of　activity；　but　more　concretely；　in　conjunction　with　a
particular　manifestation　of　that　activity　in　their　religion　and　morality；　—　forms　of　existence　which　are
intimately　connected　with　Reason；　and　share　in　its　absolute　claims。　Here　the　relation　of　mere
means　of　an　end　disappears；　and　the　chief　hearings　of　this　seeming　difficulty　in　reference　to　the
absolute　aim　of　Spirit；　have　been　briefly　considered。　




III。　Philosophic　History
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ii。　The　Essential　Destiny　of　Reason

　　　　　　　　（3）　The　Embodiment　Spirit　Assumes　—　the　State

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　40

The　third　point　to　be　analysed　is；　therefore　…　what　is　the　object　to　be　realised　by　these　means；　i。e。
what　is　the　form　it　assumes　in　the　realm　of　reality。　We　have　spoken　of　means；　but　in　the　carrying
out　of　a　subjective；　limited　aim；　we　have　also　to　take　into　consideration　the　element　of　a　material；
either　already　present　or　which　has　to　be　procured。　Thus　the　question　would　arise：　What　is　the
material　in　which　the　Ideal　of　Reason　is　wrought　out？　The　primary　answer　would　be；　…　Personality
itself　…　human　desires　…　Subjectivity　generally。　In　human　knowledge　and　volition；　as　its　material
element；　Reason　attains　positive　existence。　We　have　considered　subjective　volition　where　it　has　an
object　which　is　the　truth　and　essence　of　a　reality；　viz。　where　it　constitutes　a　great　world…historical
passion。　As　a　subjective　will；　occupied　with　limited　passions；　it　is　dependent；　and　can　gratify　its
desires　only　within　the　limits　of　this　dependence。　But　the　subjective　will　has　also　a　substantial　life　…
a　reality；　…　in　which　it　moves　in　the　region　of　essential　being　and　has　the　essential　itself　as　the
object　of　its　existence。　This　essential　being　is　the　union　of　the　subjective　with　the　rational　Will：　it
is　the　moral　Whole；　the　State；　which　is　that　form　of　reality　in　which　the　individual　has　and　enjoys
his　freedom；　but　on　the　condition　of　his　recognition；　believing　in　and　willing　that　which　is　mon
to　the　Whole。　And　this　must　not　be　understood　as　if　the　subjective　will　of　the　social　unit　attained　its
gratification　and　enjoyment　through　that　mon　Will；　as　if　this　were　a　means　provided　for　its
benefit；　as　if　the　individual；　in　his　relations　to　other　individuals；　thus　limited　his　freedom；　in　order
that　this　universal　limitation　…　the　mutual　constraint　of　all　…　might　secure　a　small　space　of　liberty　for
each。　Rather；　we　affirm；　are　Law；　Morality；　Government；　and　they　alone；　the　positive　reality　and
pletion　of　Freedom。　Freedom　of　a　low　and　limited　order；　is　mere　caprice；　which　finds　its
exercise　in　the　sphere　of　particular　and　limited　desires。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　41

Subjective　volition　…　Passion　…　is　that　which　sets　men　in　activity；　that　which　effects　〃practical〃
realisation。　The　Idea　is　the　inner　spring　of　action；　the　State　is　the　actually；　existing；　realised　moral
life。　For　it　is　the　Unity　of　the　universal；　essential　Will；　with　that　of　the　individual；　and　this　is
〃Morality。〃　The　Individual　living　in　this　unity　has　a　moral　life；　possesses　a　value　that　consists　in　this
substantiality　alone。　Sophocles　in　his　Antigone；　says；　〃The　divine　mands　are　not　of　yesterday；
nor　of　today；　no；　they　have　an　infinite　existence；　and　no　one　could　say　whence　they　came。〃　The
laws　of　morality　are　not　accidental；　but　are　the　essentially　Rational。　It　is　the　very　object　of　the
State　that　what　is　essential　in　the　practical　activity　of　men；　and　in　their　dispositions；　should　be　duly
recognised；　that　it　should　have　a　manifest　existence；　and　maintain　its　position。　It　is　the　absolute
interest　of　Reason　that　this　moral　Whole　should　exist；　and　herein　lies　the　justification　and　merit　of
heroes　who　have　founded　states；　…　however　rude　these　may　have　been。　In　the　history　of　the
World。；　only　those　peoples　can　e　under　our　notice　which　form　a　state。　For　it　must　be
understood　that　this　latter　is　the　realisation　of　Freedom；　i。e。　of　the　absolute　final　aim；　and　that　it
exists　for　its　own　sake。　It　must　further　be　understood　that　all　the　worth　which　the　human　being
possesses　…　all　spiritual　reality；　he　possesses　only　through　the　State。　For　his　spiritual　reality　consists
in　this；　that　his　own　essence　…　Reason　…　is　objectively　present　to　him；　that　it　possesses　objective
immediate　existence　for　him。　Thus　only　is　he　fully　conscious；　thus　only　is　he　a　partaker　of　morality　…
of　a　just　and　moral　social　and　political　life。　For　Truth　is　the　Unity　of　the　universal　and　subjective
Will；　and　the　Universal　is　to　be　found　in　the　State；　in　its　laws；　its　universal　and　rational
arrangements。　The　State　is　the　Divine　Idea　as　it　exists　on　Earth。　We　have　in　it；　therefore；　the
object　of　History　in　a　more　definite　shape　than　before；　that　in　which　Freedom　obtains　objectivity；
and　lives　in　the　enjoyment　of　this　objectivity。　For　Law　is　the　objectivity　of　Spirit；　volition　in　its　true
form。　Only　that　will　which　obeys　law；　is　free；　for　it　obeys　itself　…　it　is　independent　and　so　free。
When　the　State　or　our　country　constitutes　a　munity　of　existence；　when　the　subjective　will　of
man　submits　to　laws；　…　the　contradiction　between　Liberty　and　Necessity　vanishes。　The　Rational
has　necessary　existence　as　being　the　reality　and　substance　of　things；　and　we　are　free　in　recognising
it　as　law；　and　following　it　as　the　substance　of　our　own　being。　The　objective　and　the　subjective　will
are　then　reconciled；　and　present　one　identical　homogeneous　whole。　For　the　morality　（Sittlichkeit）
of　the　State　is　not　of　that　ethical　（moralische）　reflective　kind；　in　which　one's　own　conviction　bears
sway；　this　latter　is　rather　the　peculiarity　of　the　modern　time；　orality　is　based
on　the　principle　of　abiding　by　one's　duty　＇to　the　state　at　large＇。　An　Athenian　citizen　did　what　was
required　of　him；　as　it　were　from　instinct；　but　if　I　reflect　on　the　object　of　nay　activity；　I　must　have
the　consciousness　that　my　will　has　been　called　into　exercise。　But　morality　is　Duty　…　substantial
Right　…　a　〃second　nature〃　as　it　has　been　justly　called；　for　the　first　nature　of　man　is　his　primary
merely　animal　existence。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　42

The　development　in　extenso　of　the　Idea　of　the　State　belongs　to　the　Philosophy　of　Right；　but　it
must　be　observed　that　in　the　theories　of　our　time　various　errors　are　current　respecting　it；　which
pass　for　established　truths；　and　have　bee　fixed　prejudices。　We　will　mention　only　a　few　of
them；　giving　prominence　to　such　as　have　a　reference　to　the　object　of　our　history。　The　error　which
first　meets　us　is　the　direct　contradictory　of　our　principle　that　the　state　presents　the　realisation　of
Freedom；　the　opinion；　viz。；　that　man　is　free　by　nature；　but　that　in　society；　in　the　State　…　to　which
nevertheless　he　is　irresistibly　impelled　…　he　must　limit　this　natural　freedom。　That　man　is　free　by
Nature　is　quite　correct　in　one　sense；　viz。；　that　he　is　so　according　to　the　Idea　of　Humanity；　but　we
imply　thereby　that　lie　is　such　only　in　virtue　of　his　destiny　…　that　he　has　an　undeveloped　power　to
bee　such；　for　the　〃Nature〃　of　an　object　is　exactly　synonymous　with　its　〃Idea。〃　But　the　view　in
question　imports　more　than　this。　When　man　is　spoken　of　as　〃free　by　Nature；〃　the　mode　of　his
existence　as　well　as　his　destiny　is　implied。　His　merely　natural　and　primary　condition　is　intended。　In
this　sense　a　〃state　of　Nature〃　is　assumed　in　which　mankind　at　large　are　in　the　possession　of　their
natural　rights　with　the　unconstrained　exercise　and　enjoyment　of　their　freedom。　This　assumption　is
not　indeed　raised　to　the　dignity　of　the　historical　fact；　it　would　indeed　be　difficult；　were　the　attempt
seriously　made；　to　point　out　any　such　condition　as　actually　existing；　or　as　having　ever　occurred。
Examples　of　a　savage　state　of　life　can　be　pointed　out；　but　they　are　marked　by　brutal　passions　and
deeds　of　violence；　while；　however　rude　and　simple　their　conditions；　they　involve　social
arrangements　which　（to　use　the　mon　phrase）　restrain　freedom。　That　assumption　is　one　of
those　nebulous　images　which　theory　produces；　an　idea　which　it　cannot　avoid　originating；　but　which
it　fathers　upon　real　existence；　without　sufficient　historical　justification。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　43

What　we　find　such　a　state　of　Nature　to　be　in　actual　experience；　answers　exactly　to　the　Idea　of　a
merely　natural　condition。　Freedom　as　the　ideal　of　that　which　is　original　and　natural；　does　not　exist
as　original　and　natural。　Rather　must　it　be　first　sought　out　and　won；　and　that　by　an　incalculable
medial　discipline　of　the　intellectual　and　moral　powers。　The　state　of　Nature　is；　therefore；
predominantly　that　of　injustice　and　violence；　of　untamed　natural　impulses；　of　inhuman　deeds　and
feelings。　Limitation　is　certainty　produced　by　Society　and　the　State；　but　it　is　a　limitation　of　the　mere
brute　emotions　and　rude　instincts；　as　also；　in　a　more　advanced　stage　of　culture；　of　the
premeditated　self…will　of　caprice　and　passion。　This　kind　of　constraint　is　part　of　the　instrumentality
by　which　only；　the　consciousness　of　Freedom　and　the　desire　for　its　attainment；　in　its　true　…　that　is
Rational　and　Ideal　form　…　can　be　obtained。　To　the　Ideal　of　Freedom；　Law　and　Morality　are
indispensably　requisite：　and　they　are　in　and　for　themselves；　universal　existences；　objects　and　aims；
which　are　discovered　only　by　the　activity　of　thought；　separating　itself　from　the　merely　sensuous；
and　developing　itself；　in　opposition　thereto；　and　which　must　on　the　other　hand；　be　introduced　into
and　incorporated　with　the　originally　sensuous　will；　and　that　contrarily　to　its　natural　inclination。　The
perpetually　recurring　misapprehension　of　Freedom　consists　in　regarding　that　term　only　in　its
formal；　subjective　sense；　abstracted　from　its　essential　objects　and　aims；　thus　a　constraint　put　upon
impulse；　desire；　passion　…　pertaining　to　the　particular　individual　as　such　…　a　limitation　of　caprice　and
self…will　is　regarded　as　a　fettering　of　Freedom。　We　should　on　the　contrary　look　upon　such
limitation　as　the　indispensable　proviso　of　emancipation。　Society　and　the　State　are　the　very
conditions　in　which　Freedom　is　realised。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　44

We　must　notice　a　second　view；　contravening　the　principle　of　the　development　of　moral　relations
into　a　legal　form。　The　patriarchal　condition　is　regarded　…　either　in　reference　to　the　entire　race　of
man；　or　to　some　branches　of　it　…　as　exclusively　that　condition　of　things；　in　which　the　legal　element　is
bined　with　a　due　recognition　of　the　moral　and　emotional　parts　of　our　nature；　and　in　which
justice　as　united　with　these；　truly　and　really　influences　the　intercourse　of　the　social　units。　The　basis
of　the　patriarchal　condition　is　the　family　relation；　which　develops　the　primary　form　of　conscious
morality；　succeeded　by　that　of　the　State　as　its　second　phase。　The　patriarchal　condition　is　one　of
transition；　in　which　the　family　has　already　advanced　to　the　position　of　a　race　or　people；　where　the
union；　therefore；　has　already　ceased　to　be　simply　a　bond　of　love　and　confidence；　and　has　bee
one　of　plighted　service。　We　must　first　examine　the　ethical　principle　of　the　Family。　The　Family　may
be　reckoned　as　virtually　a　single　person；　since　its　members　have　either　mutually　surrendered　their
individual　personality；　（and　consequently　their　legal　position　towards　each　other；　with　the　rest　of
their　particular　interests　and　desires）　as　in　the　case　of　the　Parents；　or　have　not　yet　attained　such　an
independent　personality；　…　（the　Children；　…　who　are　primarily　in　that　merely　natural　condition
already　mentioned。）　They　live；　therefore；　in　a　unity　of　feeling；　love；　confidence；　and　faith　in　each
other。　And　in　a　relation　of　mutual　love；　the　one　individual　has　the　consciousness　of　himself　in　the
consciousness　of　the　other；　he　lives　out　of　self；　and　in　this　mutual　self…renunciation　each